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India’s Neighbourhood Policy:  





This paper would focus on the fault-line of Indian Neighbourhood Policy particularly in the context 
of its handling of Nepal’s Constitutional Crisis Post-2015. In the light of the statement of former Indian 
Prime Minister Vajpayee, ‘friends can change but not neighbours who have to live together,’ it can be 
easily inferred from this statement that the neighbourhood policy is holding a very significant place in 
Indian foreign policy. Since independence, India has been pursuing ‘Neighbourhood Policy. The 
incumbent government has also conceived ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy under the visionary and 
dynamic leadership of PM Modi, but the irony is that notwithstanding this policy, India has recently 
lost its geopolitical space in Nepal despite such policy. On the contrary, China has made its 
geopolitical space in Nepal.  
 
Keywords: India’s Neighbourhood Policy, Nepal Constitutional Crisis, Indian Fault Line, China 





India and Nepal had been sharing civilizational ties since the time immemorial connected 
by the geography, history, geo-culture, and religion etc. These multifaceted ties had been 
formalized by signing the Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950. However, during 
the last several decades, these bilateral ties had been witnessed many ups and downs, 
notwithstanding Nepal being figuring prominently in India’s neighbourhood policy. Nepal 
has been craving for democracy since the 1950s and partly remained successful in achieving 
this goal. Till date, it had seen seven constitutions including the latest one of 2015, 
promulgated on 24 September. The comity of nations has well acknowledged the constitution, 
but on the contrary, India had shown displeasure by just taking ‘note’ of it, which had 
created strong ripples in the bilateral ties.  
The new government was formulated with an absolute majority under the stewardship of 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Clear and decisive political mandate unshackled the National 
Democratic Alliance-II (NDA) government from the limitations of a coalition of the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA-I and II), which had posed several challenges for the Indian 
foreign policy maneuverings. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had set out the three priority 
areas of foreign policy agenda in its manifesto of General Election 2014, under the dynamic 
leadership of prime ministerial candidate Modi. The first priority is to spur its economic 
development, by improving India’s international ties with key states (especially in East Asia), 
second, bolstering India’s security, particularly from Pakistan and China and third, to 
increase India’s global standing and influence, leveraging of the ‘soft power’ in the West and 
the developing world.1 Though nothing much has been mentioned in its manifesto regarding 
                                                          
1 Bharatiya Janata Party’s Election Manifesto 2014. Accessed 6 July, 2016. http://www.bjp.org/images/ 
pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf.  
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the neighbouring countries, but by calling the leaders of SAARC countries for the oath-
taking ceremony of the PM, the focus of new government towards the neighbouring 
countries was made publicized.    
The neighbourhood policy had been started even before the Indian independence. During 
the Annual Convention of the Congress Party, Jawaharlal Nehru in his first speech on foreign 
policy (December 1927) said, “The people of India have no quarrel with their neighbours and 
desire to live at peace with them” (Appadorai, 1949: 38). The fundamental principles of 
Nehruvian foreign policy, focusing on the Asian solidarity, non-alignment, decolonization 
and pursuit of international peace. Scholars like Verma and Mishra (1969: 91–96) have 
argued that Nehru’s policy has been considered as ‘a balanced blend of idealism and 
enlightened self-interest. Power (1969: 21–36), has claimed that it was a combination of, 
‘anti-imperialism, liberal internationalism, neutralism, neo-Marxism, and Gandhism.  
Neighbourhood policy has been pursued through the Nehruvian principles by the 
successors of Nehru, like Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, P.V. Narasimha 
Rao and Manmohan Singh. Even the non-Congress governments (1977–1980, 1989–1991, 
1996–2004), have followed the Nehruvian principles uninterruptedly. Noorani (1978: 216–
228) has believed that Morarji Desai had practiced genuine ‘non-alignment’ even warming 
up to the US. These values had remained the linchpin of governments under V.P. Singh, 
Chandrashekhar, and I.K. Gujral. The UPA-I and II have also focused on neighbouring 
countries. PM Manmohan Singh said, “Our priority should be to devote ourselves to building 
a structure of cooperative and mutually beneficial relations with our neighbours.”2  
Soon after taking over the control of the government, PM Modi has given priority to the 
neighbouring countries. He had invited all the heads of SAARC countries for his oath-taking 
ceremony. In the neighbourhood first policy of Modi government, Nepal has been given an 
important place. During the last seventeen years, no Indian PM had had visited Nepal.  
Within a couple of months, PM Modi had paid two visits to Nepal. However, this crescendo 
of cordiality had lost very soon due to the constitutional crisis of Nepal. The new constitution 
of 2015, became one of the major irritants in the bilateral relations of both the countries. 
They drifted away from each other which had provided more geopolitical space to China 
over India in the Himalayan state.  
 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL MOORINGS OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY 
 
Michael (2013) has argued that Kautilya and Arthashastra have been explicitly 
interlinked with the Indian foreign policy. The Arthshastra is considered as a manual of 
statecraft, in which the incumbent or the potential king has been guided, how to rule a state 
or what rules are to be followed to gain  geopolitical and geostrategic space in terms of 
power. It has remained the lighthouse of inspiration and philosophy for the thinkers and 
politician who built the Mauryan empire in India.  Boesche (2002: 7) has quoted the German 
sociologist Max Weber who once said, the Arthshastra is a, “truly radical 
‘Machiavellianism’ . . . compared to it, Machiavelli’s The Prince is harmless.” Kissinger 
(2014), has acknowledged it as, “a combination of Machiavelli and Clausewitz.”  
                                                          
2 PM Manmohan Singh. (2004, October 26). Speech in Combined Commanders’ Conference, New 
Delhi. Accessed 6 July 2016. http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid= 
32. 




In international relations, the immediate neighbours have always been perceived as an 
enemy. It has been argued that Indian neighbourhood policy has been derived from 
Arthashatra’s Raja-mandala Theory. This theory had been fathered by Kautilya (371-283 
BC), who was a jurist, royal advisor, teacher, philosopher and economist. According to this 
theory, bordering states are hostile states that are forming a circle around the country. 
Similarly, next circle of states forms another set of hostile states around the king. The second 
circle of states could be perceived as the natural allies of the king, against the first circle of 
hostile states, which is lying between them. Quintessentially, it can be put as, “the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend.” Pillalamarri (2015), has argued that this logic, is the basis of India’s 
foreign policy. 
According to this theory, foreign policy is based on the principle, ‘Peace is preferable to 
war.’ The foreign policy of a country is governed by the six devices like sandhi (making 
peace), asana (maintaining neutrality), policy of yaanam (preparing for war), samshraya 
(seeking support/shelter), waging a war, and the last one is dvaidhibhaava (dual policy). In 
order to make the foreign policy very effective, the shadgunya (six-fold foreign policy) have 
been provided with the four-fold upayas (devices). These devices include Sama 
(conciliation), Daana (pacifying with gifts) Bheda (aggravating dissension amongst the 
opposite parties) and Danda (punishment). These devices have been perceived as a doctrine 
of sorting out the conflicting issues among the neighbouring countries.  The Raja- mandala 
theory is very near to the realist theory. Some scholars (Boesche, 2002; Khattak, 2011; 
Michael, 2013; Liebig, 2014) have argued that the basis of Indian foreign policy is the 
Rajamandala theory.  
 
2.1 Genesis of Indian Neighbourhood Policy 
 
Since independence, India has been holding the pre-eminent position in the South Asian 
region for given of its size, population, economy and military power. India has been 
contributing 75 per cent to the South Asian population. It is holding 80 per cent of the total 
GDP of the region. Militarily, it is the major country of South Asia and spending five times 
more than the rest of the countries putting together on its defence. In the post-Cold War and 
the opening of the economy, India has emerged as a global player in the international politics. 
A practitioner of the Indian foreign policy, the former Indian foreign secretary Nirupama 
Rao (2009-2011), has argued and accepted that a ‘peaceful neighbourhood is mandatory for 
the realization of India’s vision of economic growth.’ 3  Realizing the geopolitical and 
geostrategic imperatives, India has invoked all the neighbouring countries to be partners and 
contribute to the regional growth and prosperity (MEA, Annual Report 2005: 1). But on the 
other hand, the neighbouring countries have been perceiving India as interfering, non-
accommodative, selfish and overbearing. Due to this, bilateral or multilateral relations have 
been marred on account of recurring tensions. 
 The neighbouring countries had tried to check and restrict India geopolitically and geo-
economically through the overt or covert strategic relationships with the extra-regional 
powers. Nanda (2003: 201) has argued that India’s bilateral relations with all its neighbours 
had been remained off the keel in one way or the others. Kashmir issue has become one of 
the critical reasons for three wars between Indian and Pakistan. Cross-border terrorism 
                                                          
3 Rao, Nirupma (2010). Speech at Harvard on ‘India’s Global Role.’ September 20. Accessed 6 July 
2016. http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/741/. 
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further heightened the drift between both the countries. Ethnic conflict and maritime 
boundary dispute are the major irritants between Sri Lanka and India. India-Bangladesh ties 
have been plagued by the controversial issues such as border issue, Ganga water sharing, and 
Moore Island issues. In this background, the neighbours remained suspicious that India has 
been taking undue advantage of the weak bargaining capacity of each state in a bilateral 
dialogue. They view Indian bilateralism as an instrument of coercive diplomacy and Indian 
hegemony (Bhashin, 2008). 
Nehru had followed the neighbourhood first policy since independence towards the 
Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan (Yasin, 1994: 68–117). He unfolded his Nepal 
policy, ‘Much as we stand for independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong 
in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would be a risk to our 
security (Nehru, 1971: 436). Subrahmanyam (1968: 28), held the view that Indo-Nepal Peace 
and Friendship Treaty 1950, ‘as a unilateral guarantee offered by India against any external 
attack on Nepal.’ Indo-China war took place in 1962, which has increased the geostrategic 
salience of the Himalayan kingdom in Nehru’s geostrategic calculus as argued by Nanda 
(2003b: 203). 
Pakistan has remained one of the most crucial neighbours to deal with. Nehru’s approach 
towards Pakistan has been shaped by his experience of the Congress and the Muslim League 
interactions and the communal polarization in the subcontinent during the national 
movement. Notwithstanding of the internationalization of Kashmir conflict, Nehru referred 
this problem as ‘not too serious’, a ‘family issue’ and even went on to dismiss it as a 
‘domestic quarrel.’4  PM believed that handing over Kashmir to Pakistan is a death and 
destruction of India (Nehru, 1963: 206-207). The problems of people of Indian origin and 
expanding western influence in Sri Lanka made him somewhat apprehensive. In the case of 
Sri Lanka, Nehru showed some interests in the People of Indian Origin (PIO) in the island 
nation, and somewhat concerned about Western influence over there. Singh (2002: 78) has 
argued that PM had maintained good relationship and friendship with Afghanistan. 
 
2.2 The Post-Nehru Period: A Mix of Continuity and Conflict 
 
The first successor of Nehru was Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had a very brief period at the 
helm of affairs. But, he did not make any significant change in India's foreign or 
neighbourhood policy. He continued with the Nehruvian neighbourhood approach. After the 
death of PM Shastri, Indira Gandhi took over the charge of Indian foreign policy, known as 
the iron lady in diplomatic circles. She did not like the external influence at all in the 
neighbouring countries. As per the study of Ram (1992: 326), she had extended strategic 
partnership with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) by signing of Peace 
and Friendship Treaty (August 1971), in order to counterbalance the geopolitical and 
geostrategic changes (Sino-Pakistan strategic relations since the early 1960s and the Sino-US 
rapprochement, started in 1971). According to Richter (1987: 250-265), the emergence of 
Bangladesh in 1971, engagement with Pakistan and the Shimla agreement (1972), focusing 
on bilateralism were some of the famous characters of Indian foreign policy under PM Indira 
Gandhi. However, she has made it clear that India was not interested in expanding its 
‘spheres of influence’ but the internal and external commentators interpreted her policy as 
                                                          
4 The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002). Accessed 6 July, 2014.  
athttp://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch8.htm. 




the ‘India Doctrine.’ 
The national emergency (25 June 1975-21 March 1977), imposed by PM Indira Gandhi, 
has dissipated the monopolization of Indian National Congress over the Indian politics. 
However, the new Janata government maintained continuity adorned by friendly and 
accommodative characters. Signing a five-year river water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh 
(1977) and visit of Foreign Minister Vajpayee to Pakistan (1978) for reviving the bilateral 
relations were some of the significant achievements of this government. However, being out 
of power, a serious note was taken by Indira Gandhi and criticized Janata government’s 
softer policy. Coming to power in 1979, she again took over the helm of affairs and followed 
previous policy without any alteration.   
Rubinoff (1991: 313-334), has noted that in the post-Indira Gandhi era, Rajiv Gandhi had 
also followed the ‘Indira Doctrine’ towards the neighbours. However, this policy underwent 
a dramatic shift, when Indian relations with the neighbouring countries had been plagued by 
the bilateral disputes. Both Nepal and Bhutan had asked for the review of their respective 
treaties with India. Consequently, the Rajiv government took very hard decisions vis-a-vis 
Nepal, to renew the Trade and Transit Agreement (1978) in 1989. India issued a blockade, 
causing shortages of fuel, salt, cooking oil, food and other essential commodities in Nepal 
which were imported from India (Devi, 2011: 164). Also, this policy strengthened the 
popular movement against the King and acted as a catalyst for Nepal’s transition to 
democracy in 1990.  
Rajiv’s policy towards Pakistan and China made a new beginning. He paid a visit to 
China (19–23 December 1988) which took after a long spell of 34 years. Malik (1995: 317-
355) has noted that this visit of PM Rajiv has given a new lease of life to the Indo-China 
relations. He has also tried to improve ties with Pakistan. Behuria (2011: 51-65) has 
commented that after Zia’s death in August 1988, Rajiv had tried his best to make closer and 
cordial engagements with Pakistan. He had visited Pakistan in December 1988 and signed a 
significant bilateral agreement on non-attack of nuclear installations. However, the growing 
militancy in Kashmir derailed the peace process between both the countries.  
India’s Sri Lankan policy had remained very assertive. Bhasin (2001: 700) has argued 
that despite knowing, military action was not a solution to the ethnic crisis, even then had 
sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). He forced President Jayawardene (4 February 
1978–2 January 1989), to sign the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 1987 and received assurance 
that the latter’s soil wouldn’t be allowed to use against India. India had also acted promptly 
to avert a coup in Maldives in November 1988, which established its status as a regional 
power. 
In the post-1990s, sea changes had taken place not only in Indian political system rather 
even in the foreign policy. The monopoly of Congress Party came to an end which coincided 
with the democratic movement of Nepal in the early 1990s. Due to this, the bilateral relations 
have been improved between both the countries. PM V.P. Singh had adopted a relatively 
mild policy towards Nepal and lifted the blockade. In the liberalization era, coalition politics 
was started in India.  The first coalition government of V.P. Singh did not last long and again 
Congress-led government under the stewardship of PM P.V. Narasimha Rao came to power 
in 1991. Pakistan policy of this government had remained more or less the same. However, 
Scott (2009: 107-143) has argued that a significant shift in the overall foreign policy 
orientations has been brought about in the post-Cold War period. PM Rao had also tried to 
extend Indian outreach up to the extended neighbourhood such as Israel, Southeast and 
Northeast Asia under its multi-pronged Look East Policy. 
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The coalition governments of Deve Gowda (June 1996–April 1997) and I.K. Gujral 
(April 1997–March 1998), having a brief period at the helm of affairs have made significant 
changes in India’s neighbourhood policy. PM I.K. Gujral had vast experience in his account, 
being a former foreign minister. He followed a non-reciprocal accommodative policy known 
as Gujral Doctrine (Gupta 1997, 308–309). This doctrine has laid down five principles in his 
speeches resulted in the signing of a 30-year treaty between India and Bangladesh on 
December 12, 1996 (Murthy, 1999: 639-652). Ganguly (1997: 126-135) argued that Gujral 
Doctrine did not include Pakistan and criticised labelling it as not a wholehearted effort to 
generate trust with the neighbours. However, Noorani (2000: 3949-3958) acknowledged that 
Gujral Doctrine more or less became the anchor of Indian foreign policy  
 
2.3 Vajpayee & Singh’s Neighbourhood Policy: Conciliatory & Accommodative  
Approach 
 
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
(1998–2004), had left no stone unturned to follow cordial relations with the neighbouring 
countries. Chiriyankandath & Wyatt (2007: 203), have argued that taking over in 1998, PM 
Vajpayee developed a very conciliatory approach towards Pakistan. He visited Pakistan in 
February 1999 by the inaugural Delhi-Lahore Bus service. It was PM Vajpayee’s first chance 
to strengthen neighbourhood policy. Bus diplomacy was used and established a regular road 
link for the first time since 1947. The Lahore Declaration was signed in February 21, 1999 
by committing to resolve bilateral disputes through dialogue. However, this cordiality was 
lost very shortly after due to Kargil misadventure (1999). In the context of Kashmir issue, 
one more effort was made by Vajpayee government with the then Pakistani President Pervez 
Musharraf (2001-08) in the Agra Summit (2001). This effort was also failed on account of 
stubborn attitude on the part of Pervez Musharraf. It has been argued that the other 
neighbouring countries had not received adequate attention from the NDA government due 
to its  preoccupation with Pakistan. 
The United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a coalition government, came to power in 2004 
led by Dr. Manmohan Singh (2004-14). However, this government has followed the 
continuity of the previous governments. This government continued with the peace process 
with Pakistan despite some terrorist activities across the border. To accommodate the 
Bhutanese government’s demand for revision of the Treaty (1949) was accepted and revised  
in 2008 (Rizal, 2015). A significant role was played by India in the peace process of Nepal 
by bringing the Maoists into the political mainstream. Similarly, efforts have been made to 
improve the bilateral relations with other South Asian countries.  
In this paper, only the case of Nepal will be discussed in the context of the incumbent 
government’s neighbourhood first policy. The rationale for taking only Nepal for scholarly 
analysis is, since the launch of this policy, the Nepal constitutional crisis was the first 
challenge, by which it could be tested. Nepal is very critical from India’s security point of 
view. But this country has been overlooked by the previous governments. Therefore, the 
incumbent government has given an important place to Nepal in its foreign policy for 
maintaining it geopolitical and geostrategic space in Nepal. Therefore, in order to check the 









3. MODI’S NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST POLICY 
 
A perceptive scholar and former Indian diplomat to Nepal, Jayant Prasad in his article, 
“India’s Neighbours written for ‘Seminar,’ in which he argued the core objective of the 
foreign policy of the Modi government is to accelerate the ongoing economic transformation 
of India. He was of the opinion that PM Modi has attached a lot of importance to this 
objective. A disturbing neighbourhood is both distracting and harmful for the economically 
emergent India. The new government realized that without cordial relations with the 
neighbouring countries, India and the South Asia cannot continue to grow.   
The neighbourhood policy of NDA-II government was publicly proclaimed in the first 
presidential address to the Parliament in June 09, 2014 in which he underlined the incumbent 
government’s “determination to work towards building a peaceful, stable and economically 
inter-linked neighbourhood, essential for the collective development and prosperity of the 
South Asian Region.”5 During the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, PM 
Modi in his speech once again highlighted the place of neighbours in Indian foreign policy as, 
“A nation’s destiny is linked to its neighbourhood. That is why my government has placed 
the highest priority on advancing friendship and cooperation with its neighbours.” PM Modi 
has conveyed a friendly message towards neighbourhood by calling the SAARC leaders to 
the oath-taking ceremony on May 26, 2014. Very shortly, it was translated into reality by 
visiting all South Asian countries including Nepal.  
 
3.1 India’s Nepal Policy: Vibrancy Under Modi  
 
During his visits to Nepal, PM Modi made it very clear that he felt a special affinity with 
the country as argued by senior diplomat Vivek Katju. He became the first Prime Minister to 
visit Nepal after a long gap of seventeen years in August 2014. The Indian Foreign Minister 
Sushma Swaraj paid a three days visit to Nepal (July 27-29, 2014), after a long hiatus of 25 
years. During the visit, she revived the Indo-Nepal Joint Working Groups, which had been 
lying dormant during the last 25 years. Also, she co-chaired the meeting of the commission 
and discussed various aspects of bilateral relations.  
PM Modi was honoured and privileged to become the first foreign leader to address the 
Nepali Parliament-cum-Constituent Assembly. By his speech, he touched and moved the 
hearts of the Nepali people. The most important part of speech was about Nepal’s 
constitution-making exercise. He was the firm conviction that a Nepal’s successful 
constitution had shown the world, how the armed conflicts could be ended with former 
combatants through successful constitution-making exercise. He has also made it clear to the 
Nepalese leadership that its your constitution, it is up to Nepal to decide and India did not 
have any intention to show the way. PM Modi has conveyed his message in a speech that 
constitution should be inclusive, representing the aspirations of all regions and people of 
Nepal.   
From geopolitically and geostrategically perspective, Nepal holds a very prominent place 
in Indian policy. Modi’s vision for Nepal has been well articulated in his speech delivered in 
Constituent Assembly-cum-Parliament in which he said, “We have always believed that it is 
                                                          
5 Address by the President of India, Shri Pranab Mukherjee to Parliament at Central Hall of Parliament 
2014, June 9. Accessed 6 July, 2016. www.presidentofindia.nic.in/speeches-detail.htm?293. 
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not our task to interfere with what you do but to support you in the path you decide to take.” 
Since independence, India has been supporting the democratic movement in Nepal. He urged 
the Nepalese political leadership that, “India respects the federal democratic republic as 
envisioned by Nepal.” President Ram Baran Yadav reciprocated to PM Modi speech as, 
“You have won our hearts with your address in Parliament.” The visit of PM Modi was 
moved CPN-Maoist leader Prachanda to comment it as a “new chapter” in Indo-Nepal ties. 
PM Modi tried to expand and take bilateral relations to a new height. To make Nepal as a 
reliable partner in the neighbourhood policy, he has given a ‘HIT’ formula. Under this, India 
wanted to extend its help to Nepal in building its highways (H), information highways (I) 
and transitways - transmission lines (T). India is keen to double power supply to Nepal. 
Though Nepal has a lot of potential for hydropower, still it lacks energy for domestic 
demand. To facilitate this, pipelines would be built to provide oil to the Himalayan nation 
(Kharel, 2014). 
Intending to enhance connectivity between both the countries, Kathmandu-Delhi bus 
service was flagged off. Some MoUs were signed by both the countries in the field of 
security, trade, border infrastructure, connectivity, tourism and cultures during the two Prime 
Ministerial visits (MEA Annual Report, 2014-15, 15-16). One advanced light helicopter- 
Dhruv, has been given to Nepal. An Emergency Trauma Centre was inaugurated in 
Kathmandu. A soft loan of $1 billion was granted to Nepal. Indian PM Modi offered prayer 
and donated sandalwood worth Rs. 30 mn to Pashupatinath temple. PM Modi said he wanted 
to turn the “hostile borders benign and ultimately gateways for free trade and commerce... 
borders must be bridges, not barriers.” These moves on part of PM Modi were well 
reciprocated by Nepal and the Kathmandu Post, in one of its editorials wrote: “Modi Mantra 
Warms Nepal’s Hearts,” which shows the place of PM  Modi in the heart of Nepalese people.  
Jaiswal (2015), a perceptive scholar of Indo-Nepal issues, has argued that under Modi 
government, India has started giving more priority to Nepal policy due to its security 
imperatives. Stable and peaceful Nepal could take care of Indian security interests. 
Economically, India wanted to engage constructively with Nepal. Modi government 
identified that generation of hydropower is the potential area of bilateral cooperation which 
could meet the shortage power demand of both the countries. The Indian firms are the major 
investors in Nepal along with 150 Indian ventures. About 40 per cent of total approved 
foreign direct investment is contributed only by these companies. These are engaged in the 
major areas of manufacturing, services (banking, insurance, dry port, education and telecom), 
power sector and tourism industries etc. The signing of BIPPA (Bilateral Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement) between Nepal and India would be a major fillip to 
investment. India-funded 'hydroelectricity projects, infrastructure projects were discussed by 
the leadership of both the countries. The major conflicting issues between both the countries 
were also taken on board like reviewing the 1950's Treaty of Peace and Friendship. 
PM Modi’s Nepal Policy has also been well taken up by the Western media. The 
Washington Post has argued in one of its reports regarding Modi’s neighbourhood policy as 
a shift in foreign affairs for India. Gardiner working with the New York Times as journalist 
explained in one of his reports dated August 4, 2015 that Indian policy vis-à-vis Nepal has 
been undergoing a paradigmatic shift. Since its independence, India had been strong 
supporter of the Nepalese monarchy. However, it has been argued that during the visit, PM 
Modi did not meet with former King Gyanendra, which signified that India would not 
support the return of monarchy anymore which has substantated the argument of Gardiner.    
The Indian government has also keenly watched the Nepalese constitution making 




process. PM Modi praised the efforts of Nepalese people for constitution writing process. He 
considered it as an example for the rest of world for a peaceful resolution of a violent conflict. 
Taking a note of the Maoists who abandoned their violent politics to join the political 
mainstream in 2006 was an exceptional success on the part of the political leadership of 
Nepal and for that; he extended congratulations for choosing the ballot over the bullet. He 
also exhorted the Nepalese lawmakers to use their Rishi-man (sage mind) to ensure that the 
constitution ought to envision Nepal of the next 100 years in addition to being inclusive to 
connect all parts of the society. 
 
3.2 Nepal’s New Constitution of 2015   
 
India is having the significant stakes in the peace and the constitution-making process of 
Nepal as the new constitution would decide the prospective bilateral relations. Nepal has 
been engaged in the constitution-making process since 2008 after the end of the monarchy. 
Nepal has made its constitution successfully which was ultimately promulgated in September 
20, 2015. Though the Nepalese constitution has been welcomed by the international comity 
of nations, but India has shown its displeasure over the constitution, notwithstanding its 
passage with more than an absolute majority. 
In 2008, the Nepalese monarchy came to an end. The demand for new constitution 
became the need of the hour and for this objective, the Constituent Assembly-cum-
Parliament was constituted in 2008. The election for the first CA took place on 10 April 2008.  
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) emerged as the dominant party by taking 220 out of 
575 seats during the Nepalese Constituent Assembly (CA) election, 2008. Despite getting 
four extensions by the Nepalese Supreme Court, the first CA was failed to draft and deliver 
the constitution by the set deadline which came to an end in 2012. The Supreme Court of 
Nepal did not give a further extension. The second CA was elected in 2013. Unofficially, the 
one-year deadline was fixed for the second CA by the Assembly to deliver the constitution.  
The new constitution of 2015, comprised of 305 articles and eight parts. This constitution 
is started with a preamble by incorporating the principle of “socialism based on democratic 
values.” The constitution has democratic provisions as possessed by the best constitutions of 
the world. It contains the major principles such as democracy, republicanism, federalism, 
secularism and inclusiveness. Under the provision of proportional representation, efforts 
have been made to make it inclusive covering vulnerable sections of society such as women, 
untouchables (Dalits), and other marginalized groups (Phuyal, 2015).  
 
3.3 Geopolitical Fault Line: Post Constitution 2015   
 
Nepal has been deeply embedded in the geopolitical and geostrategic calculus of India. 
The recent dynamics took place in Nepal has a direct and indirect impact on Indian interests. 
Certainly, India has legitimate security concern in addition to its geopolitical interests. Due 
to sharing an open border with Nepal, Indian security concerns have been emanating from 
the international criminal organisations operating within Nepal, insecure Indian investment, 
Maoist movements, and Islamist terrorism along with fake curreny etc. Apart from these 
concerns, Nepal has been becoming a safe haven for potential drug and arms smugglers. 
Unstable Nepal has been becoming a threat to Indian interests from the geopolitical and 
geostrategic point of view. These concerns have been figuring very prominently in Indian 
policy, and consequently, some hard decisions have to be taken by the Indian policy makers.  
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More importantly, the new constitution has created serious concerns for India, reason 
being marginalization of Indian ethnic. Apart from this, a lot of violence and chaos along the 
Indo-Nepal border when the bordering state like Bihar was about to undergo election. To 
understand the Indian concern, one has to make an analysis of the various dynamics of the 
issue.  Indian concerns emanating from the new constiton,  has been specifically pointed out 
by by Muni (2015) as, (i) the carving of federal provinces, (ii) proportional representation, 
(iii) citizenship rights, (iv) the identity of the Nepali State, and (v) its ideological parameters.  
The Madhesis and Tharus have been organising the protests against the promulgation of 
the the new constitution, and it was celebrated as a black day. It is widely believed that the 
new constitution has been failed to meet the aspirations of the Indian ethnic people. The 
issues like federalism, secularism, citizenship, rights of the Madhesis, Tharus, and Janjatis, 
are the main concerns of not only ethnic people rather India as well. In prevailing such 
milieu, India has given a prescriptive advice to Nepal to look into these serious concerns of 
the ethnic people. In order to allay the concerns and pacify the Indian ethnic people, India 
has suggested seven amendments in the Nepal Constitution. Seeing the concerns of the 
ethnic communities out of the Nepalese constitution, India took it as, “not broad-based” or 
“equal” and did not represent “two-thirds of the population.” The Indian ethnic like 
Madhesis and Tharus blockaded supply of essential goods to Nepal from the Indian side. Due 
to this, Nepal had faced a shortage of fuel and other necessary supplies. On the contrary, 
Indian sympathy with ethnic people became the primary concern of Nepalese leadership. The 
Nepalese society across the wide spectrum is of the firm conviction that rather than 
controlling the violent people on the border, rather India has been helping them. It created a 
lot of anti-Indianesss feeling among the Nepalese people.    
Realizing the gravity of issue, India used its state apparatus to convince the political 
leadership of Nepal to pay due attention to the demands of Indian origin people in Nepal. On 
the other hand, the Indian government did not take any action to lift the blockade on the 
Indo-Nepal border to ensure the essential supplies to Nepal. Moreover, the Indian 
government issued an advisory-cum-prescriptive statement to Nepal, “Statement on the 
situation in Nepal,” which stated: “We note the promulgation in Nepal today of a 
Constitution. … We urge that issues on which there are differences should be resolved 
through dialogue in an atmosphere free from violence and intimidation, and institutionalised 
in a manner that would enable broad-based ownership and acceptance” (MEA, 2015, 
September 15). Indian Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar said, “India had always been strongly 
supportive of the Constitution-making process in Nepal, and it would like its completion to 
be an occasion of joy and satisfaction, not agitation and violence.”  
Actions taken on part of India vis-à-vis Nepal in the context of constitution promulgation, 
have been considered direct or indirect intervention in its domestic political issues as argued 
by Nepalese people, scholars, commentators, and politicians. The same echo has been sensed 
from the print, electronic and social media as well. It has left very indelible imprints on 
Nepal-India relationship. Sensing the anti-Indianness in Nepal, leaders from Indian 
opposition parties, scholars, commentators and strategic thinkers have also taken note of 
such policy and considered that it has failed to maintain the status quo of its geopolitical 
space in Nepal. The India-Nepal bilateral relationship, as argued by Nihar Nayak (2016), that 
it is at the ‘lowest ebb due to anti-India sentiments in Nepal, in reaction to the perceived 
political interference by India.’ Further, he argues that Nepalese media, civil society groups, 
and academics have been very critical of what they call ‘India’s micro-management’ in 
Nepal. The same scholar has also argued that the growing ‘anti-Indian sentiment’ in Nepal, 




ultimately going to harm Indian interests. In fact, ‘anti-Indian sentiment’ is a primary 
challenge in Nepal-India relations, and addressing and minimising anti-Indianess would be 
key to improving the bilateral ties. In the light of this backdrop, it would be wise for the 
government of India to formulate a comprehensive and long-term Nepal friendly policy. 
Muni (2015) has argued that India has followed a ‘hands-off’ policy, i.e., rather 
encouraging a ‘Nepali grown model’ to generate consensus over the constitution making. But 
very shortly, on the contrary, it has become embroiled in the domestic issues of Nepal.  Roy 
(2015, September 24) has argued in one of his reports in the Indian Express that Prime 
Minister Modi’s suggestions have been ignored in the constitution. Haidar and Bhattacherjee 
(2015, September 21) have quoted one senior Indian diplomat in their report written for the 
Hindu, ‘Not a celebratory moment for India’ who expressed his discontentment as 
“Constitution was just not good enough to address all concerns” of the Madhesi and Tharu 
people.” India sent its Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar to Nepal with an urge to hold on the 
promulgation of new constitution until the aspirations of the ethnic nationalities are not being 
met.  
India conveyed Nepal to add seven amendments in the constitution to make it more 
inclusive. India through its state apparatus has asked Nepal to include seven amendment to 
the constitution. These include article 63(3)- electoral constituencies proportional to 
population; article 21- ‘proportional inclusion’; article 283- qualification (being citizens of 
descent) to hold high-ranking government posts be expanded; article 86–representation 
should be based on the population of each state: Article 154- timeframe for delineation of 
constituencies be 10 years instead of 20-year; article 11(6)- acquisition of naturalised 
citizenship be automatic on application. Apart from these seven recommendations, disputed 
Kanchanpur, Kailali, Sunsari, Jhapa and Morang districts, home to a large population of 
Madhesis, included in the Madhes provinces. 
Indian leadership’s stand on the new constitution was mixed one. Only the CPI (M), one 
of the Indian political parties, hailed the promulgation of Nepal constitution as a historic step. 
People’s Democracy- CPI (M)’s mouthpiece wrote in its editorial, “We congratulate the 
people of Nepal, the three major political parties — the Nepali Congress, the CPN (UML) 
and the UCPN (M) - and all democratic forces for this significant achievement.” On the 
contrary, IBN (2015), reported that the ruling party took a very hard stand on the Nepalese 
constitution.  
Nepalese perception of Indian stand on its constitution is also required to analyze. Nepal 
has accused India of the latter’s unofficial blockade. PM Nepal, KP Oli, has levelled very 
serious charges against India. He believed that it was not only the protesters rather its Indian 
government was responsible for the unofficial blockade against Nepal. While talking to AFP 
in an interview, K P Oli said, “India is saying those people (protesters) are in no man’s land, 
they are blocking the roads so that (Indian trucks) are not being able to supply, that’s not 
true.” The Deputy PM Prakash Man Singh during his recent visit to UN also raised this issue 
with UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon. Nepal’s Home Ministry’s spokesman, Laxmi 
Prasad Dhakal said, “Indian security personnel has prevented cargo trucks from crossing the 
border.” Apart from the official line, most of the Nepalese commentators were also echoing 
the same opinion. They argue that India is supporting the Madeshis demands. Kanak Mani 
Dixit, Publisher of Himal South Asian, said, “This is a blockade done through the official 
connivance of the Indian government. Indian customs officials, Indian border police, and 
Indian Oil Corp., the monopoly supplier to Nepal, have all worked together to block the 
border citing orders from New Delhi.” By diagnosing these comments on social, print or 
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electronic media, it is readily inferred that there is a common stand of the Nepalese public 
and private people vis-a-vis Indian take on the constitution.   
A hard-hitting editorial in the Kathmandu Post (2015, September 22) issued a sharp 
riposte as “But Delhi would do well not to be seen as crossing the red line to meet its 
objective. It could box itself in an awkward position and see it lose its diplomatic leverage 
against individual parties and sections of the polarized society.” Kumar (2015) has quoted 
Shakya who said, “New Delhi should not be seen to be taking side with any of the groups. 
Otherwise, this will have very destabilizing influence in the Himalayan state.” 
Indian scholars have also cautioned the Indian government in this regard. According to 
Muni (2015a), India has failed to understand the internal dynamics of posturing and power-
sharing within and between Nepali political parties. Consequently, it has associated with 
right and left wing people within the Nepali political spectrum. On account of their activities 
in Nepal, Indian image is being tarnished. In such situations, India should use quiet sustained 
diplomacy for getting for the marginalized groups – rather than reinforcing the already 
existing forces of anti-Indian pseudo-nationalism in Nepal. Moreover, a journalist working 
with Indian TV new agency ANI asked India to exercise restraints rather than involving itself 
in Nepal’s imbroglio. Kumar (2015a) has quoted, Indrani Bagchi in one of his article written 
for the online journal the Diplomat that, “India cannot openly bat for the Madhesis and other 
disaffected groups without alienating the hill people or Kathmandu.” Chenoy (2015), an 
expert on Indian politics and comparative politics has also advised the Indian government to 
tread very cautiously vis-à-vis Nepal constitutional issue. Nepal is an old friend and a 
particular neighbor of India. It should be treated accordingly. All diplomatic channel should 
remain open, and while dealing with Nepal, all political norms should be strictly followed.  
The unofficial blockage has been viewed as an intervention in Nepalese internal issues. It 
has been considered that blockade is not a bilateral matter between India and Nepal, but it is 
having the potential to damage shared prosperity among the SAARC (South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation) member countries. Bangladesh Minister of 
Commerce Tofail Ahmed, while speaking to The Hindu (October 19, 2015), viewed 
blockade as hurting Nepal’s economy, and urged the Indian government to lift the blockade 
as soon as possible. Pakistan has also expressed concern over Indian action against Nepal. 
Through Twitter hashtag #PakStandsWithNepal, Pakistan expressed their angst against the 
reservations of India towards the newly promulgated Constitution of Nepal. Jean Lambert, 
chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with the countries of South Asia, 
has also expressed concern over the unofficial blockade of Nepal. She emphasized the need 
for regional solidarity in this new phase of Nepal’s development. In a press statement, 
Lambert (2015) said, “The unofficial ‘blockade’ at the Nepali border only serves to hurt the 
Nepali people who are still recovering from the devastating earthquakes earlier this year.” 
Efforts have been made by both the countries to pacify the anti-feeling against each other, 
soon after the formation of a new government of Nepal, Indian PM spoken to Nepalese New 
PM KP Oli and congratulated him on the new assignment. The Nepalese government sent its 
deputy PM Kamal Thapa to India to talk about a wide array of issues with the Indian 
government. Despite these efforts on both sides, Nepali diplomats and politicians believed 
that bilateral ties are at the lowest ebb and damaged. 
 
3.4 China’s Geopolitical Advantage  
 
Constitutional crisis of Nepal has a different meaning for both India and China. Both 




India and China have taken the promulgation of Nepalese constitution on different notes. 
China has made it as a very positive step and extended deep core welcome to it. On the 
contrary, Indian approach was very casual and conveyed to Nepal that it had just taken a 
‘note’ of it. India believed, the new constitution has failed to, “support a federal, democratic, 
republican, and inclusive” Nepal as argued by Ganguly and Miliate (2015). For the given of 
these dynamics, the bilateral relations between India and Nepal, have taken a nosedive. This 
blockade has not been allowing essential commodities including the fuel trucks to cross the 
border into Nepal. However, New Delhi refuted this charge and put the blame of the mass 
protests on the part of Nepal. In the context of fuel, India has a monopoly over the supply of 
the fuel which was interrupted due to this blockade. Nepalese people have been facing a 
shortage of the essential commodities. The problem was further exacerbated by the blockage 
of road links between China and Nepal through the Himalayas due to earthquake since April 
2015. The disruptions on the part of India had underscored the Himalayan kingdom’s 
profound economic vulnerability and inflamed the anti-India passions among the Nepalese. 
China has cleared the blocked path to connect Nepal to ensure a steady flow of essential 
commodities through the newly opened passages. China is likely to be at a geopolitical 
advantage out of this turmoil as the argument put forward Pant (2015, October 15) in his 
commentary.   
Above and all, China has welcomed the Nepalese constitution. In contrast to India, its 
spokesperson Hong Lei of Chinese Foreign Ministry very positively said, “China sincerely 
congratulates Nepal on promulgating the new constitution.” Hoping that this constitution 
would prove a milestone not only for Nepal and but also it would create a crescendo of 
cordiality between both the countries. Chinese foreign ministry issued a very positive and 
adhesive press release, “It is hoped that Nepal will seize the opportunity to realize the 
national unity, stability and development.” China committed to provide continuous economic 
support to Nepal. China not only values its relations with Nepal rather strongly willed to 
deepen further mutually beneficial cooperation. Peaceful Nepal is in the interest of China and 
for its economic and social development, assistance will be provided as Chinese capacity 
allows. 
Ramesh Nath Pandey, a veteran diplomat and one of the longest serving Ministers in 
Nepal, told the Hindu (October 18, 2015) that the blockade created a vacuum in the public 
mind which has been filled by China. India has lost visibility in Nepal, which is expressed by 
Pandey in these words, “The blockade hurt Nepal’s supply lines, but it also removed the 
profile of India inside Nepal. Someone had to fill that vacuum that India left. China is now a 
psychological force in Nepal because of India’s support to the blockade.”6 Ideas of Pandey 
have also been echoed in one of the foremost constitutional lawyers of Nepal, Bipin 
Adhikari’s words, “India-Nepal relation is vast and has multiple dimensions. In comparison, 
Nepal-China ties are small. But after this blockade which has lasted more than two months, 
Nepal has become aware that it urgently needs an option beyond India. China provides an 
alternative to India and China has always treated Nepal with respect which is missing in 
India’s attitude to Kathmandu.” China has remained very positive towards Nepalese 
government delegation for negotiation for fuel supply. On the other hand, Nepalese Prime 
Minister K P Oli and Former PM Prachanda met to Chinese Ambassador Wu Chuntai in this 
                                                          
6 Extracted from, ‘China Has Filled Vacuum Left by India.’ The Hindu. 2015, October 18. Accessed 6 
July, 2016. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-has-filled-vacuum-left-by-india-nepali- 
diplomats/article7775295.ece 
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Indian Neighbourhood policy has had a long history going back to Mauryan period. This 
policy has been pursued consistently by all the Indian government since independence. Its 
origin can be traced to the Raja-Mandala’s theory, in which the principles have been laid out 
how to effectively conduct the foreign policy of gaining and maintaining geopolitical and 
geostrategic space in terms of power. On taking over the control of the new government, PM 
Modi has delineated his foreign policy by giving special focus on the neighbouring countries. 
He perceived the peaceful neighbourhood is the first condition of the economic development 
of not only India rather as the whole South Asia. He provided a new vitality to Indian 
neighbourhood policy by inviting all the heads of SAARC countries for the oath-taking 
ceremony.  
Nepal has been given very important place in India’s neighbourhood policy under the 
dynamic stewardship of PM Modi, the reason being having strategic location between two 
Asian giants China and India and long porous border sharing with the latter. Thus, from a 
security point of view, it is imperative for India to give it an important place in its 
neighbourhood policy. For the given bonds of civilizational and historical relations, India has 
been enjoying special relations with Nepal. However, the predecessors of incumbent 
government, have not given adequate space to Nepal. In order to rectify such diplomatic 
errors, the incumbent government has given it an important place in the Neighbourhood  
First Policy, by paying special focus in terms of exchange of bilateral visits, extending soft 
credit line, heightening economic cooperation by providing help in the development of health, 
education, defense, and other infrastructural assistance.  
Within a couple of months, PM Modi paid two visits to Nepal. During his visit to Nepal, 
he got the opportunity to address the Nepalese Parliament. His visit and a slew of gifts have 
created the crescendo of cordiality between both the countries. However, the cordiality has 
not only evaporated very shortly rather had created more sense of bitterness due to Indian 
stand on the Nepal’s newly promulgated constitution. India did not accept the new 
constitution due to not fulfilling the aspiration of the Indian ethnic like Madhesis, Tharus, 
and Janjatis. These people created a lot of violence and imposed blockade on the Indo-Nepal 
border. The Nepalese leadership and people have expressed anguish over the prescriptive 
advice on the part of India to incorporate seven Amendment to fulfil the aspiration of the 
Indian ethnic people rather than controlling these people. The Indian stance on the newly 
promulgated constitution and alleged support to the protesters created a feeling of bitterness 
among the various sections of society. On the other hand, China not only well acknowledged 
the Nepalese new constitution rather assured the Nepalese leadership of Chinese support in 
all possible sectors. China has won the hearts of every Nepalese by providing timely help 
during the protesters blockade. Despite of its neighbourhood first policy in place, the  
incumbent government, has been failed to maintain the status quo in terms of geopolitical 
space in Nepal due to mishandling the crisis. Rather it earned the ire of the Nepalese people 
shrinking its space in their hearts. On the other hand, by its deft diplomacy and exploiting the 
tense situation, the vacuum filled by China. China made a geopolitical space in Nepal due 
India’s prescriptive measure. Last but not the least, Nepal is holding paramount importance 




for India for its geostrategic and geopolitical interests. In this background, it is highly 
recommended that Indian policy should be very cautious, friendly, and calibrated vis-a-vis 
Himalayan kingdom. It is highly recommended that India should come out of big brotherly 
attitude, rather treating the smaller Himalayan nation as equal partner.           
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